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Abstract 
 
This exploratory qualitative study investigates the reaction of the selling side of 
the real estate market to mandatory disclosure of information as a consumer 
protection mechanism in residential property transactions, the largest purchase 
most consumers will ever make. In Australia, where mandatory disclosure 
requirements for vendors, mortgage providers and real estate agents vary on a 
state by state basis from stringent to no formal legal information requirements, 
little is known about the relative effectiveness of different disclosure regimes or 
whether the red tape and compliance costs of disclosure may outweigh the 
benefits. To address this research gap, in-depth interviews were conducted with 
five Queensland industry experts (lawyers, real-estate agents, mortgage 
provider). These interviews highlight the transaction costs and benefits of 
disclosure from the perspective of the supply side of the market, and raise 
questions about the perceived legal, economic and social effectiveness of 
mandatory consumer protection mechanisms in the Australian real estate 
market. Future research directions are outlined in light of these preliminary 
findings.  
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With over $110 billion spent on residential property in Australia annually (Real Estate 
Institute of Australia, 2002), buying a home is the largest financial transaction most 
people will ever make. Unfortunately, the process of searching for and buying a home 
is so emotionally, financially and legally challenging that it has been described as one 
of life’s most stressful life events (Hahn & Smith, 1999; Meyer, 1987). Indeed, 
approximately 15% of complaints by consumers to the Queensland Office of Fair 
Trading concern real estate transactions, covering diverse issues such as two-tier 
marketing, agent kickbacks and non-disclosure of faults by vendors (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2004). A classic and tragic example of non-disclosure of faults in Australia is 
that of vendor Stephen Brooks, who was aware of a heater leaking carbon monoxide 
and was advised that he was playing ‘Russian Roulette’ by not fixing the leaking 
heater. Instead, Brooks sold the house and heater unfixed. The new occupants and 
their daughter died from carbon monoxide poisoning, with Brookes eventually 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter (Griggs, 2001). A more recent case where the 
ethical and legal obligations of real estate agents were highlighted was the sale of the 
notorious ‘Gonzales triple murder house’ in Sydney, where Sef Gonzales murdered his 
mother, father and sister in 2001 (Hinton & Ors v. Commissioner of Fair Trading, 
NSWADT, 2006). The agents did not inform potential purchasers of the crime, arguing 
that they sell “bricks and mortar, and consider what happened to previous owners to be 
immaterial to the sale” (p8) and that they were “not under an obligation to 
‘communicate all details’ to purchasers of property” (p29). The New South Wales 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal disagreed, finding that the real estate agents 
“engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, namely the non-disclosure of murders 
which occurred on the property” (p2).  
 
Mandatory Disclosure in Australian Real Estate Transactions  
Whilst the cases described above are extreme examples, repeated consumer 
complaints about real estate has prompted many Australian state governments to 
move away from the traditional principles of ‘caveat emptor’ or ‘buyer beware’ and 
implement a range of mandatory disclosure of information laws, which require vendors 
and real estate agents to disclosure certain information about the property to the 
purchaser. The main aim of these disclosure laws is to lessen the risk associated with 
the non-financial side of property transactions and protect the consumer through 
reducing the information asymmetry between the vendor and purchaser. As Table 1 
below illustrates, all Australian states have at least some form of mandatory disclosure 
from either vendors or agents or both.  
 
Table 1: Mandatory disclosure requirements in residential property transactions, 
Australia and New Zealand1 
 
State/Country Degree of Vendor 
Disclosure 
Degree of Agent Disclosure 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) extensive mandatory disclosure2 mandatory disclosure 
New South Wales (NSW) extensive mandatory disclosure2 mandatory disclosure 
Northern Territory (NT) none mandatory disclosure 
Queensland (QLD) none extensive mandatory disclosure3 
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South Australia (SA) mandatory disclosure on vendors no 
Tasmania (TAS) mandatory disclosure on vendors mandatory disclosure 
Victoria (VIC) extensive mandatory disclosure1 mandatory disclosure 
Western Australia (WA) none extensive mandatory disclosure3 
New Zealand (NZ) none none 
2 Requirement for vendor statement  
3 Represents the degree of mandatory agent disclosure, from limited to extensive   
 
Importantly, unique differences in local history, real estate industry lobbying strength, 
property market growth and consumer pressures has meant that states differ in how 
they regulate the residential property transaction process, with each state focussing on 
and regulating different stages in the real-estate supply chain. Four Australian 
jurisdictions (ACT, NSW, VIC, and TAS) have enacted mandatory disclosure of 
information requiring both vendors and real estate agents to disclose certain 
information about their property. Three states (WA, QLD, and the NT) do not currently 
have formal vendor mandatory disclosure of information requirements, although a 
standard form contract used in property sales has been developed to encourage 
vendor disclosure (Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, Warner et al., 2004), whilst New 
Zealand does not have mandatory disclosure legislation. In an attempt to standardise 
disclosure practices in Australian states, Griggs (2001) recently outlined a Draft Vendor 
Disclosure Statement for Australia. Originally developed by the Tasmanian Office of 
Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading (Hayes, 2000), this draft Vendor Disclosure 
Statement covers a diverse range of issues, including local government notices, 
building issues, encroachments and strata or community lot, which Griggs (2001) 
believes:  
should not impose extra transaction costs associated with the selling of real 
estate. Rather the costs will be redistributed from the purchaser to the 
vendor…sales, vendor disclosure statements provide an opportunity to assist 
the purchaser in their decision making process without imposing an unfair or 
burdensome obligation on the vendor or her/his agent (p. 154).    
 
The Effectiveness and Value of Disclosure in Real Estate Transactions 
However, despite calls for increasing and standardising disclosure practices in all 
Australian states and territories, there is remarkably little evidence about how these 
processes of disclosure work in the real world. Providing useful and usable information 
to consumers is a key principle of consumer protection, viewed as a way to balance the 
power and information asymmetry between consumers and traders. Yet, although the 
provision of information is typically viewed positively, an emerging body of literature 
has highlighted the limits of information as a consumer protection mechanism and has 
raised questions about the effectiveness and value of disclosure. Of particular concern 
are three key potential limitations of disclosure, specifically consumer comprehension, 
the benefit-cost ratio, and moral hazard.   
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Consumer Comprehension 
The first potential limitation of disclosure is the extent to which consumers read, 
understand or utilise the information that is disclosed to them, with Hadfield, Howse 
and Trebilcock (1996) suggesting that “if complete information on the part of 
consumers were to be established as a precondition for the validity of consumer 
transactions, very few would met the test” (p 6). Indeed, research in America suggests 
that over a third of Americans had signed common legal documents(e.g., loan 
agreements, leases, insurance forms) without reading them, citing reasons such as 
lack of time, explained by someone, too difficult, trust and not important (Wogalter, 
Howe, Sifuentes & Luginbuhl, 1999). However, even if people do read legal 
documents, the degree to which the ‘legalise’ or legal jargon is understood is 
debatable. Howells (2005) has outlined in detail the limits of providing consumers with 
information, arguing that few consumers make use of the information provided. 
Similarly, Murphy and Richards (1992) compared the efficacy of alternate disclosure 
statements in rental car radio advertisements and found that the shorter statement was 
as effective as the longer statement.  
 
The Relative Benefit-Cost Ratio  
Second, from a cost-benefit perspective, one long-standing criticism of general 
consumer protection mechanisms is that “they fail to take into consideration the 
increases in costs and therefore prices, generated by companies’ putting into effect the 
measures demanded by the consumerists” (Foxall, 1980, p 31) and that as “information 
is often costly both to obtain and process, consumers often must choose at what point 
they should remain rationally ignorant” (Hadfield et al., 1996). Traditional economic 
theory models consumer behaviour on the assumptions of perfect information and the 
maximization of expected utility.  In fact consumers rarely if ever possess all the 
information necessary to make optimal purchasing decisions, and in the light of this, 
and also because of the search and transaction costs of discovering information, they 
will make decisions on the basis of what is known as bounded rationality – a choice 
process that allows for the presence of limited information, a limited capacity by the 
consumer to process information, and an inability to evaluate fully any given product 
and to enumerate and evaluate all of the possible alternative purchases (Kahneman, 
Knetsch & Thaler, 1986).  
 
The identification of alternatives, and an evaluation of their contribution to the welfare 
of a consumer, is a long and expensive procedure.  Rather than identifying the 
optimum purchase, the consumer will instead opt for one that is generally acceptable, 
or at least yields a more agreeable outcome than has been obtained from the current 
purchase.  People opt for rules of thumb or other techniques to help them more easily 
make their purchasing decisions – and accordingly will at times behave in ways that 
may not appear to be rational according to the standard economic theory of consumer 
behaviour (Rabin, 2002).  The area of economics that considers such conduct has 
become known as behavioural economics. It is an approach based on empirical testing 
of the consumer decision-making process. It seeks to explain why consumers make the 
choices that they do in the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty and their 
own limited abilities, why they do not follow strict classical utility-maximizing rules, and 
why these choice processes may indeed be rational, given the consumer’s 
circumstances, knowledge and abilities.  Such behaviour has been termed ‘satisficing’, 
in the sense that consumers will select an alternative if it is found to be satisfactory 
according to all the indicators used by them in their decision-making processes. 
Moreover, in the context of real-estate disclosure, a precise calculation of the costs and 
benefits is difficult, with Hadfield et al. (1996) arguing in the Canadian context, that: 
since the cost of information is crucial, consumer protection instruments that 
actually generate information that is costly for consumers to interpret or access 
are counter-productive. This principle may imply the re-evaluation of quite a 
wide range of consumer protection laws and regulations, especially those that 
mandate detailed disclosure of contents or ingredients, complex details of the 
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price, terms and conditions of a transaction or very specific caveats about the 
use of the product (p64-65). 
To date, although researchers have not explicitly explored the costs of disclosure in the 
context of real estate transactions, an analysis of the effectiveness of used motor 
vehicle disclosure requirements designed to protect consumers from bad ‘lemon’ cars 
in the United States, Pratt and Hoffer (1985) concluded that “these disclosure 
requirements do not seem to decrease a prospective buyer’s risk of purchasing a 
lemon” (p185).  
 
Moral Hazard    
A third concern is moral hazard, where consumers believe they are protected or 
assume the law will protect them and thus will not take appropriate self-protection 
actions. Viscusi (1984) offers an example of this, documenting a correlation between 
child-resistant safety caps and accidental poisonings in the United States which led him 
to suggest that the presence of safety caps may have made consumers less safety-
conscious. Similarly, Hadfield et al. (1996) describe how people with insurance are less 
likely to take care to avoid losses, whilst in the context of investment services Llewellyn 
(1995) warns that consumer regulation “creates the impression that the consumer need 
not take care with respect to the firms with which he or she deals in financial services. 
This becomes a moral hazard of regulation: a hazard that regulation itself creates the 
image that less care need be taken” (p17). In the context of disclosure in real estate, 
the gradual shift away from principles of caveat emptor may actually lead consumers to 
assume, often falsely, that the law will always protect them. Figure 1 below illustrates 
how several factors may foster a real estate environment characterised by moral 
hazard.  
 
 
 
 
     
 Negative Spillover  
           Effects 
 
                                                            Confident Market  
 
MORAL HAZARD? 
 
Figure 1: Overview of potential costs, benefits and market implications of 
disclosure 
 
To date, surprisingly little is known about the effectiveness of disclosure as a consumer 
protection technique. However, with the federal government recently directing the 
Productivity Commission to review Australia’s current competition and consumer 
protection framework (Productivity Commission, 2005), it is timely to investigate the 
effectiveness of consumer protection laws, specifically mandatory disclosure 
requirements, in real estate transactions. In Australia, mandatory disclosure 
requirements for vendors, mortgage providers and real estate agents vary on a state by 
state basis, with little known about the relative effectiveness of these different 
disclosure regimes or whether the red tape and compliance costs of disclosure may 
outweigh the benefits. Thus, this exploratory qualitative study investigates the reaction 
of the selling side of the real estate market to mandatory disclosure of information as a 
consumer protection mechanism in residential property transactions, the largest 
purchase most consumers will ever make.  
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A total of five in-depth interviews were conducted with Queensland residential property 
experts, specifically two lawyers, two real-estate agents and a mortgage provider. 
Lawyer 1 was a partner in a large commercial law firm located in the Brisbane central 
business district that specialised in acting for large developers, whilst Lawyer 2 was a 
partner in a smaller suburban firm that specialised in property and consumer advocacy. 
The Mortgage Broker and Real Estate Agent 1 were employees, whereas Real Estate 
Agent 2 was a partner. All participants were older males who had worked in the 
property industry for a minimum of five years (Real Estate Agent 1), with the majority 
involved for over two decades.  
 
Procedure  
Using purposive sampling, participants were recruited through the author’s professional 
networks and snowball sampling, a non-probability sampling method where participants 
nominate other people in their professional or personal networks to also participate in 
the research. An email was sent to potential interviewees, outlining the research and 
inviting them to participate in an in-depth interview exploring the effectiveness of 
disclosure as a consumer protection mechanism in residential property transactions. A 
$25 gift voucher was offered in appreciation of their time and opinions. Those 
interested in participating were invited to email the first author for more information and 
to schedule an interview time. Those who agreed to participate were sent an 
information sheet outlining the project and key research questions, thereby giving them 
the opportunity and time to reflect on their experiences with disclosure prior to the 
interview. The interviews were all conducted by the first author, taking place in a 
convenient location for the interviewee, primarily their business premises and local 
cafes. The interviews lasted for between 45 minutes and 2 hours in duration, and were 
audio-taped and later transcribed.  
 
Semi-Structured Interviews   
A semi-structured discussion format was utilised to explore the effectiveness of 
disclosure as a consumer protection mechanism, focussing on the interviewees’ 
experiences and understandings from the supply side of the real estate market in 
Brisbane. The following areas were broadly covered: the main aim of disclosure and 
effectiveness in meeting this aim;  amount of time typically spent on disclosure issues, 
and by whom, and whether further disclosure was asked for by consumers (i.e., is the 
current level optimal in this way); and the effectiveness of disclosure as a consumer 
protection mechanism and their ideal regime. The questions were designed to foster a 
wide-ranging discussion and reflective evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
disclosure, from both an industry and consumer perspective. A key focus was to 
ensure that participants felt comfortable raising and discussing all aspects of disclosure 
and any other issues they believed were relevant. Notably, most interviewees covered 
the key areas in the interview guide without much prompting, as they reflected on the 
relative effectiveness of disclosure and their ideal regime.  
 
Analysis  
Transcripts and responses were analysed using a thematic approach, identifying 
categories, themes and patterns (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). The process of 
identifying, categorising and coding data, described by Punch (1998) as “putting tags, 
names or labels against pieces of the data” (p204), helps reduce and simplify the vast 
amount of data and identify dominant themes. A key focus was to identify the extent of 
convergence or divergence in views on disclosure from an industry perspective. Only a 
relatively small number of industry experts were interviewed (n=5) in this exploratory 
study, however, it is important to remember that in qualitative research:   
the success of a study is not in the least dependent on sample size, it is not the 
case that a larger sample necessarily indicates a more painstaking or 
worthwhile piece of research. Indeed, more interviews can simply add to the 
labour involved without adding anything to the analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987, p. 161).  
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Results  
The data clearly demonstrates that although Queensland residential property experts 
all agree that disclosure needs to be simplified, they have diverse views about the role 
of industry professionals and the impact and effectiveness of disclosure for both sellers 
and buyers. Thematic analysis identified three key themes emerging from the data; 
unfortunately, a further detailed analysis of important sub-themes is beyond the scope 
of this paper and will be addressed in future work. In this paper, each of the three key 
themes, specifically perceived costs and benefits of current disclosure requirements, 
the need for a balanced and common-sense approach, and industry challenges, is 
discussed in turn.  
 
Costs and Benefits of Disclosure  
Industry professionals all viewed disclosure is an essential component of consumer 
protection in property transactions, arguing that disclosure is about “protecting 
everyone and giving people as much information as you can, because they need to be 
educated” (Real Estate Agent 2), a way to “protect people from their own trusting 
naivety” (Lawyer 2) and “ fundamentally, it needs disclosure to ensure that the buyer is 
fully aware of the entire process and fully aware of the product which they are buying” 
(Real  Estate Agent 1). However, although all participants endorsed the intent and 
aims of disclosure, there were common concerns about the effectiveness, complexity, 
time and cost of current disclosure requirements.  
Whilst disclosure was viewed as essential, a common concern raised by all participants 
was how to motivate consumers to read and understand the complex disclosure 
documentation: “we need disclosure – it’s about how we do it effectively. I don’t think 
it’s effective at the moment.  We are just getting more paper and less understanding of 
the paperwork. I think it creates a minefield for everybody” (Lawyer 1) and “I go over 
the forms with them- tell them what I’m being paid etc and they don’t won’t to bother. I 
say please read through them, but probably only about half read through them – they 
walk out the door with a copy of it anyway” (Real Estate Agent 2). Similarly, the 
Mortgage Broker argued that “I think it would be very rare that people read through all 
that stuff. 95% of people would not read the disclosure documents, put off by their 
length, formality and complexity. But, if it was simpler and smaller in size, people might 
actually read, understand and utilise the information”. The second key theme, need for 
a common sense approach, discusses the need for a simpler disclosure template in 
more detail.  
 
Notably, the estimated cost and time spent on disclosure issues varied considerably. 
With the exception of the development lawyer, who dealt with complex new high-rise 
developments, participants generally felt there was no cost in providing information, 
arguing “what is the cost of a piece of paper? It is negligible” (Real Estate Agent 1) and 
“don’t worry about the cost of disclosure that’s nothing – it’s just part of doing business. 
It’s not an issue.  With the documentation and programme by the REIQ – cost is 
irrelevant” (Real Estate Agent 2). However, whilst dismissing the time spent on 
disclosure requirement, both agents felt that the legislation was primarily designed to 
warn consumers to not trust real estate agents, neglects the interests of the seller and 
is too focussed on procedural aspects: “there is all this fixation about these forms – the 
forms seem to be to protect the buyer from the agent but the disclosure doesn’t cover 
important things about the property” (Real Estate Agent 2). Both agents had created 
flow-charts and/or forms to ensure they correctly followed the process of disclosure 
correctly and were frustrated with different aspects of the current legislation, believing 
that it protects the buyer at the expense of the seller:  
 The intent of the act does not meet with the  practical application of the act - that 
 form sets the agent up for failure because if that is not done absolutely correctly 
 the buyer can withdraw from the contract up to settlement. When it comes to 
 the actual contract process it is so detailed that it has actually created flaws 
 where mistakes are made – buyers can get out of it easily. You have no 
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 protection for the sellers in that process….it has been done to protect the 
 buyers, sometimes at the cost of the seller. There is no balance between the 
 two. I have another form to say that I did everything in the right order and  in the 
 contract also (Real Estate Agent 1). 
 
Similarly, the consumer advocate lawyer dismissed issues of cost, arguing for full 
disclosure because “the cost is not mega-bucks” (Lawyer 2). However, the 
development lawyer estimated the time and effort involved in developing disclosure 
forms was 40-50 hours for each disclosure document. Although they had developed a 
basic template, the disclosure forms for large new high-rise developments comprised of 
nine sections over 60 double-sided pages and are “very complicated and bulky” 
(Lawyer 1). Unfortunately, he believed few consumers ever read these lengthy 
documents, except when they were looking for an excuse to get out of the contract and 
that “even the eyes of developers gaze over when we talk about disclosure issues. I tell 
my staff to write and include a brief executive summary outlining the key points, 
because clients aren’t going to read the 50 page document”. Indeed, when he checked 
with the head of clerks about whether clients read the disclosure documentation, she 
estimated that only 10% of people ever queried disclosure issues and believed that 
was because their law firm focussed on describing the purchase process in detail.  
 
 
 
Need a Balanced, “Common-Sense Approach”  
There was a consensus among industry professionals on the need for a simpler 
approach, particularly an executive summary or industry-wide template that concisely 
summarises in an easily understood checklist form, disclosure requirements and 
findings. The feeling was that, whilst the intent was good, there are flaws with the 
current disclosure laws in Queensland which are essentially limited to buyers signing a 
statutory warning statement acknowledging they have been told to seek independent 
legal advice and valuations.  
 
In particular, the consumer advocate lawyer queried the effectiveness of current 
practice, raising four key criticisms. First, the best consumer protection would be not 
allowing agents to prepare real estate contracts, as “foxes should not be permitted to 
give warnings to chickens”. His second key point was that “contracts needs to be 
prepared by a solicitor and they need to be accessible, non-goobledegook and not look 
like every other bit of paper buyers are asked to sign. Its not rocket science”. His third 
criticism was that the warning statement needed to be clear and stand out: 
The statutory Warning Statement is, in my opinion, overly wordy – more than a 
1000 words, filling 2 pages. And it looks little different form the other forms and 
papers buyers are given and have to sign. It needs to stand out and be sexy – a 
different size and colour. The problem is that, despite the intent, most contracts 
are signed by  buyers, on car boots and in kitchens, in the presence of seller’s 
agents without any legal advice or valuations. This advice in the Warning 
Statement has NOT sent swarms of buyers to lawyers, but it lets the 
government say ‘you have been warned’ (Lawyer 2).  
Fourth, he felt consumer protection laws and codes of conducts needed to be enforced 
more strongly, and that they were worthless if they are not well policed or adequately 
enforced. His perception was that, in Queensland:  
The government’s lame laws fail to protect consumers from property predators, 
real estate racketeers and consumers own trusting natures. The law protecting 
buyers does not go far enough, and doesn’t  even exist for sellers. To best 
protect consumers, governments should obligate buyers and sellers to obtain 
independent legal advice before contracts are signed (Lawyer 2). 
In particular, he advocated looking to America, particularly Minnesota, where sellers 
have to disclose all material facts that could adversely and significantly effect an 
ordinary buyer’s use and enjoyment of the property. To define what ‘material facts’ are, 
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there is a list of questions for sellers to answer on diverse issues such as past flooding, 
fire or smoke damage, structural alterations, asbestos and if they smoked or kept pets 
indoors.  Within Australia, he cited the ACT as a good example of effective disclosure 
laws, where sellers must give all prospective buyers building and pest inspection 
reports and building records. This notion of sellers providing potential buyers with 
information on the property was mentioned and endorsed by both real estate agents, 
who felt it would “make a more honest and professional industry. People will be more 
happy, a lot less anger and it will save everybody money (Real Estate Agent 2).  
 
All participants suggested a potential way to streamline the process, essentially 
requiring the sellers to disclose certain elements about the property. Lawyer 2 
commented that “I would like to see something like in car sales, perhaps a “home-
worthy” certificate. It could be used as a selling tool”, whilst Mortgage Provider 1 
discussed the advantages and challenges of having a “road-worthy certificate for a 
house”, raising potential issues such as the possibility of vendor’s bribing the building 
and pest inspector or getting multiple reports and then utilising the most favourable. He 
argued for the importance of simplicity and balance in disclosure:  
 Regulation and disclosure is coming for a reason and it is to protect the 
 consumer. There are obviously instances where people are getting burnt. I 
 think it is good as long as it is not onerous.  It shouldn’t mean that it costs a 
 business more than it did before. Yes, a little bit more time is ok, as long as it is 
 not onerous.  If it makes things clearer for the borrower that’s great, but if it’s 
 going to be multi-paged documents, then that is silly (Mortgage Provider 1). 
 
Industry Challenges  
Participants highlighted two key industry challenges; the need for change in the 
industry and the imbalance between buyer and seller. There was a consensus on the 
need for a review and reform of current disclosure practices in the real estate industry, 
with participants describing the current disclosure legislation as too process-orientated 
and not focussed enough on the actual product (i.e., the qualities and features of the 
product). There was a call for an extensive review of current practice; “real estate in 
Queensland has been done the same way for about 100 years – everything else has 
changed, except for the way in which we structure and go about real estate. I would 
like the whole thing go through a review” (Real Estate Agent 1).  
 
Both real estate agents expressed concern about how their profession was perceived 
by the general public, arguing that “because it is, basically, a commission only 
business, there are a bag of bad agents out there, but the majority are good people 
and they don’t intentionally go out there to do the wrong thing” (Real Estate Agent 1). 
Both agents strongly believed that introducing template disclosure forms for properties 
would improve the image of the industry, and that “making a level playing field would 
make it harder for the dodgy agents as well” (Real Estate Agent 2). Indeed, Lawyer 2 
raised concerns about real estate skulduggery and marketeering, arguing that “every 
week, I see examples of real estate skulduggery, with people steered to ‘tame’ building 
and pest inspectors, conveyancers, solicitors and finance brokers paying kickbacks. I 
have dealt with scores of trusting home buyers (Lawyer 2).  
 
As well as emphasising the need for review and reform, participants acknowledged the 
imbalance in disclosure between buyers and sellers in residential real estate 
transactions; “my problem is that there is not enough seller disclosure. I think the buyer 
is covered pretty well “(Real Estate Agent 2). Notably, perceptions and definitions of 
imbalance differed among professions. Whereas real estate agents emphasised how 
the rigidity of disclosure requirements, and particularly the process, creates loopholes 
for buyers, Lawyer 1 focussed on the time involved in complying with disclosure 
requirements, and how buyers utilise disclosure formalities and innocent errors to get 
out of contracts; “there are not a lot of genuine people who claim misrepresentation. 
But, if someone really wants to get out of a contract they can and that creates 
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uncertainty…off the plan buyers are often are investors and they’ll use the disclosure 
clauses to get out” (Lawyer 1). Conversely, Lawyer 2 emphasised the importance of 
protecting the consumer against their own trusting natures and that “90%  of my time is 
spent trying to get people out of problems – consumers are too trusting and should not 
believe what agents say. People must not sign anything unless they have read and 
understood every word” (Lawyer 2).  
  
Discussion  
 
Given the paucity of literature exploring the effectiveness of consumer protection 
mechanisms, and particularly disclosure in real estate transactions, this exploratory 
research has highlighted how industry professionals in Queensland utilise and view 
current disclosure requirements. The qualitative findings suggest that Queensland real 
estate industry professionals generally support calls by Griggs (2001) for a universal 
Vendor Disclosure Statement for Australia that presents information “in such a way as 
to unambiguous, clear, and concise and which is known to the vendor or which should 
be known” (Griggs, 2001, p 9). The prevailing view was that there needs to be a 
comprehensive review and development of an industry-wide template which concisely 
summarises disclosure requirements and findings in a consumer-friendly checklist or 
executive summary form. The challenge, as our participants noted, is to develop 
something that (1) provides valuable information in a simple form that consumers will 
read and understand; (2) equably balances the needs of both seller and buyer; and (3) 
clarifies and simplifies the role of industry professionals in the disclosure process.  
 
This exploratory research has highlighted an interesting dichotomy: industry 
professionals seem to want to provide more detailed disclosure information, yet they 
agree consumers seldom read current disclosure documentation. There was a strong 
belief that smarter disclosure, focussing on identifying the product attributes in a 
practical, user-friendly and accessible manner, will improve both the standards and 
image of the real estate industry. Moreover, as relatively few consumers read or 
understand current disclosure legislation which utilises complex ‘legalise’ language, 
real estate industry professionals believed that there should be an executive summary 
or checklist of disclosure requirements. They advocated strongly for a simpler, 
common-sense approach, acknowledging that the “intent of the act does not meet with 
the practical application of the act” (Real Estate Agent 1) and that “the eyes of 
developers glaze over when we discuss disclosure” (Lawyer 1). There was agreement 
that the best thing for the industry may be the development of simple industry-wide 
home-worthy certificate or checklist, with only a minority of participants (2/5; Lawyer 1 
& Mortgage Provider) emphasising the costs associated with disclosure and requiring 
people to produce and comply with additional legislation. There was a general belief 
“there isn’t really a cost involved in providing information” (Real Estate Agent 1), with 
participants calling for additional, yet smarter and user-friendly disclosure which 
focuses on outlining the properties attributes.  
 
For the most part, the general range of views about disclosure did not vary dramatically 
according to occupation. However, occupation determined the element of disclosure 
participants focussed on. The development lawyer emphasised the time and effort 
involved in developing disclosure documents which, because if their complexity and 
length, were typically seldom read or utilised by their clients except when they were 
seeking a loophole to escape a contract. On the other hand, real estate agents typically 
focussed on the procedural aspects of following disclosure requirements, lamenting 
how the requirements focussed on protecting the buyer and were so specific that any 
small errors “generates loopholes which an educated buyer and solicitor can exploit” 
(Real Estate Agent 1). Notably, both agents supported full disclosure, arguing that “the 
buyer is fully aware of the entire process and fully aware of the product which they are 
buying” (Real Estate Agent 1).  Disclosure was not yet an issue for the mortgage 
provider, who are not currently legally required to disclose anything. However, he 
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acknowledged that disclosure requirements were coming for mortgage providers and 
emphasised the value of usability, arguing that there was “no point such requirements 
being 80+ pages and costing extra $10-20,000 per year with no benefit if they are 
unread by the consumer – I page is ok”.  
 
There was significant disagreement amongst participants about the role and function of 
real estate agents in the process, with the agents believing that they have been unfairly 
vilified in the legislation which essentially says “we can’t trust an agent to do the right 
thing” (Real Estate Agent 1). Conversely, the consumer advocate lawyer strongly 
believed that agents, who he compared to foxes, should not be allowed to give 
warnings to consumers (chickens) or prepare real estate contracts. The role and 
competing obligations of real estate agents was mentioned by both agents, who spoke 
of the challenges of acting “for the seller and with the buyer” (Real Estate Agent 1). 
Even the judge in the Gonzales murder house case acknowledged the ethical and legal 
obligations of disclosure are “valid issues of real day to day concern to licensed agents. 
They have troubled me in considering this matter” (Hinton & Ors v. Commissioner of 
Fair Trading, NSWADT, 2006, p29-30). Further research should explore how agents 
manage and negotiate this delicate balancing act, specifically the role of legislation, 
industry protocols and disclosure. Research conducted for the Real Estate Institute of 
New Zealand suggests that most New Zealand residential property buyers believe their 
real estate agent explained the contract for sale and purchase well and rate the fidelity 
fund, trust account regulations and rules for ethics as the most important consumer 
protection mechanisms in real estate (Crews & Hovell, 2005). Disclosure was not 
included as an option in their survey, as disclosure is not a legal requirement in New 
Zealand. Clearly, quantitative research is needed to identify the costs and benefits of 
disclosure for Australian buyers, sellers and industry professionals.  
 
Finally, with Howells (2005) lamenting the lack of research partnerships between legal 
and social science disciplines on consumer policy issues, the present paper is the first 
step to highlight the experience and effectiveness of disclosure in residential real estate 
transactions via a transdisciplinary research partnership amongst lawyers, 
psychologists and economists. Of course, this research is limited by the small sample 
size and the focus on the experiences of industry professionals in one Australian state 
only, neglecting the perspective of both consumers and professionals in other states 
with different disclosure requirements. Proposed future research will address these 
limitations, utilising both qualitative and quantitative research to explore the perspective 
of consumers and the experiences of industry-professionals in other Australian states. 
Notably, Real Estate Agent 2 was correct in his comment that “I bet everyone has said 
that there should be more disclosure”; for researchers and policy-makers, the 
challenge now is how to ensure disclosure in real estate transactions is efficient, 
effective and user-friendly, for both industry and consumers.  
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1 For vendor disclosure see Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 52A; Land and Business (Sale 
and Conveyancing) Act 1994 s 7; Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic) s 32.  In the Northern Territory, 
Queensland and Tasmania, the legislation is similar to the vendor’s common law duty to provide 
good title: Law of Property Act 2000 s 64 (NT); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 61; 
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas) s 37.  In Western Australia, the vendor must 
provide the purchaser with written notice of any mortgage, encumbrance, lien or charge of the 
land: Sale of Land Act 1970 (WA) s 7.   
 
For agent disclosure see Agents Act 2003 (ACT); Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 
2002 (NSW); Agents Licensing Act 1979 (NT); Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 
(Qld); Land Agents Act 1994 (SA); Auctioneers and Real Estate Agents Act 1991 (Tas); Estate 
Agents Act 1980 (Vic); Estate and Business Agents Act 1978 (WA). 
 
